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Developing a U.S. roadmap for dealing with totalitarian regimes has always proven to be a daunting task, especially when these states threaten the use of force to gain the international spotlight and accompanying attention. Foreign policy realists would be inclined to take a very strict, hard line with the leadership of what used to be referred to as "rogue states," a term less popular in current political lexicon but probably more accurate in description. Others may choose to let regional countries deal with the bad neighbor as the U.S. focuses on perhaps more pressing domestic needs. However, as proven throughout history, there is a danger in isolationism that will likely force a reluctant government's hand to formulate a national security strategy in the international arena.
In dealing with the North Korean regime, the U.S. has an opportunity to walk down a potentially fruitful but very long and uneasy road. In 1998, the Republic of South Korea (ROK) government, under President Kim Dae Jung, instituted a "Constructive Engagement Policy" designed to stabilize the Korean peninsula while opening up contacts at multiple levels between the two countries. Dubbed the "Sunshine Policy,"
this approach attempts to separate economics from politics and promote family reunification and other exchange programs. In light of the potential promises of this methodology, the U.S. government should support the South Korean president's Sunshine Policy as a necessary form of engaging North Korea in the 21 st century.
U.S. Policy
As of July 2000, the U.S. national interest in the Korean peninsula could be viewed as either "vital," to "ensure allies' survival and their active cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can thrive," or "extremely important," wherein the U.S. must support "the well-being of U.S. allies and friends and protect them from aggression." 1 Depending on how you interpret the subtle differences between ensuring South Korea's survival and simply maintaining the peace, it is arguable that one condition cannot exist without the other given the current UNC Armistice situation on the peninsula. Nevertheless, the U.S. has a stated national interest in promoting the wellbeing of a key ally in Northeast Asia, which has secondary effect of providing stability to the Pacific region.
In developing its foreign policy objectives related to national interests, the U.S. 
Assumptions
Arguments for support of the Sunshine Policy and its accompanying engagement strategy are rooted in basic assumptions of target state, allied, other international, and U.S. domestic interests.
North Korea: Despite its occasionally quirky actions, the governing regime must still be categorized as a rational actor. Even though classified as a "rogue" state, DPRK leadership is still able to make cost versus benefit decisions. Additionally, one should assume that the regime (1) is motivated by an interest in maintaining power, (2) maintains a sizable weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability with an intent to use it in conflict, (3) has the potential to reinitiate nuclear production capabilities, (4) possesses a limited long range missile capability to supplement its large standing armed forces, and (5) is economically unable to provide for its population for the foreseeable future.
South Korea: One could postulate that (1) ROK administration officials desire inclusion in any U.S.-North Korean negotiations, (2) the ROK government will maintain support for continued U.S. military presence in a defensive posture in South Korea, and (3) South Koreans desire peninsula reunification at some point in the future. In addition, the Sunshine Policy itself assumes that (1) there exists an emerging need to ease North Korea's concerns about domestic and external uncertainties, (2) North Korea's firepower could devastate Seoul without having ground forces even cross the current Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), (3) peaceful stability is necessary to attract foreign investment, and (4) the previous confrontational culture will gradually change to minimize the chances of renewed hostilities.
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International Players: The Korean situation does not exist in a global vacuum. In particular, regional actors such as Japan, Russia, and China can be expected to maintain an interest in Korea, particularly in ensuring Northeast Asian stability through economic ties and support of bilateral/multilateral agreements between signatories. All of these countries could also be expected to maintain some level of interest in acting as a moderator, in concert with the U.S., in resolving North-South differences.
U.S. Domestic:
Assumptions on the home front are critical in determining the applicability and validity of any national security strategy. One must expect that (1) congressional and popular support for any national strategy may vary between realist and idealist viewpoints, with recent congressional opinion leaning toward more conservative, hawkish stances, and (2) U.S. policy makers believe that positive public support for maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea in a purely defensive posture will continue for the foreseeable future.
Analysis: Strategic Engagement
The most promising approach to dealing with the North Korean regime is through engagement in economic, diplomatic, and informational arenas, while continuing to militarily contain the DPRK military forces through a strong deterrence. This national security strategy should stress full backing of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" on the diplomatic, informational, and economic levels.
Key to realizing U.S. national goals is to merge them with South Korean policy objectives where desired end states are similar. Given the realities of a ROK government that understandably shows some reluctance to deal with the social, economic, and political costs of reunification, two basic South Korean objectives emerge. The first, and probably the easiest to align with U.S. goals, is the desire to avoid war. In addition to China and Russia, Japan must play an important role in stabilizing the Korean peninsula. Despite historical animosity between Korea and Japan, the Japanese government continues to maintain a crucial stake in Korean security. 15 First, there exists a danger of any peninsula war spilling over to Japan, to include attacks against the island nation by North Korean long range missiles. Secondly, Japanese-South Korean relations have continued to improve over recent years, a relationship that can best be described as defending a regional ally vice an old friend from aggression. Finally, a reunified Korea provides a potential regional competition between Japan and China over resources. All told, Japan has opened an engagement policy with North Korea, consisting of both direct diplomatic contacts and stating formal support for President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy.
A critical element of achieving more openness through this Nobel prize winning policy is that all interested parties, whether global or regional, can engage in an informational transformation of North Korea. When the floodgates of the internet and uncensored media are opened in the DPRK, influence north of the DMZ is possible.
Although not expected to reach the average North Korean citizen bound by abject poverty and a very low standard of living, there exists the possibility of introducing a new, more entrepreneurial business class into society similar to that existing in China today. Gaining influence in the long haul could therefore be achievable as members of the current regime, many members of which are of very advanced years, begins to transition to new leadership.
Alternatives for Consideration
In analyzing approaches to achieving national security objectives in Korea, other potential methods must be addressed. Hard line compellence. Prodding North Korean compliance through coercive means on non-proliferation, missile development, and freezing of any nuclear programs has potential given the current security situation. The U.S. maintains the credibility and means to follow through, both militarily and economically, on any threat. Counterpoint:
This line of attack would likely paint the U.S. as an aggressor in the international community and increase tensions, strengthening the potential for miscommunication or a misstep leading to a regional conflict. In addition, this hard line approach would likely undercut ROK policies addressing North Korea and initiate a ROK demand for decreased U.S. troop levels in South Korea, a potentially destabilizing scenario in Asia.
Summary
A coherent national security strategy need not be complicated. Indeed, the simpler the plan, the less the chances of a foreign policy gaffe either through misunderstanding of intent or by marching in the wrong direction. In engaging the North Korean regime, President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" provides an opportunity to align U.S.
national interests with South Korean objectives to avoid conflict and attempt to bring DPRK activities out in the open. By separating economics from politics, the policy offers the best chances of peacefully bringing a rational but occasionally unpredictable actor to the negotiating table on a regular basis. The opportunity to complement strained U.S.
resources with South Korean assets further advances combined, mutual interests.
The ability to promote personal exchanges and business opportunities is critical to the success of any attempts to engender a new business class and influence North Korean decision-making in the long run. In light of the potential promises of the South Korean president's Sunshine Policy, the U.S. government should quickly back this approach to bolster ROK support before the U.S. squanders its negotiating strength in Korea through inaction and perceived disinterest.
